Two parties gained seats in the Hungarian parliament for the first time in the general elections of 2010. Both of these parties had a strong movement background, which seemed to be more obvious in the case of the radical right Jobbik, but the green LMP party also had strong ties to the Hungarian alternative movement. In this article I analyze the structural changes of the movements, which resulted in the dominance of the party-oriented structure. First, I look at the transformation of these movements from the democratic transition in 1989 until the 2010 elections. In the second part of the article I analyze the national context structure, the external environment of the movements. I conclude that in case of the green-alternative movement the new electoral opportunities, the shortcomings of political consultation and the lack of strong allies favored the party-oriented structure. For the radical right movement the expanded access to the party system, the ineffective policy implementation capacity of the state and the repression by the authorities pushed the movement's structure to the party-oriented model.
Introduction
The structural conditions of the emergence and success of new parties is an established field of political party research (Harmel and Robertson, 1985; Ignazi 1996; Tavits, 2006; Bolleyer and Bytzek, 2013) . In the case of movement or new politics parties, the presence of a strong social movement is also regarded as a structural condition, which facilitates the emergence of parties (Kitschelt, 1989; Kaelberer, 1998; Burchell, 2002) . However, with a few exception (Odmalm and Lees, 2007) , less research was conducted on the party formation as a strategic option from the aspect of a social movement. The party systems of the countries in Eastern Central Europe were regarded recently unstable with a volatile electorate, where the elite and political entrepreneurs have a more important role in party system development than social movements (Lane and Ersson, 2007; Tavits, 2008) . Still, as the Hungarian case illustrates, bottom-up political initiatives can achieve electoral breakthrough in the region. In 2010 two new parties, the ecologist LMP (Politics Can be Different) and the radical right Jobbik entered the Hungarian parliament as the result of the general elections. The aim of this article is to understand the internal dynamic of party formation of social movements, that is the move towards the party oriented model as the dominant organizational model of the movement. Thus, instead of focusing on the success of LMP (Fábián, 2010) and Jobbik (Karácsony and Róna, 2011; Kovács, 2013) as political parties, this paper deals with the transformation of the movements themselves from the democratic transition until the 2010 parliamentary elections. This transformation is a key element of the success of the movement parties LMP and Jobbik. I will also analyse the circumstances, i.e., the political context structure (Rucht, 1996) which influenced the institutionalization of the two movement actors. Under movement I understand a complex set of mechanisms, which mobilizes the networks of activists, supporters, and organizations, which acts for the sake of social-political change. This political action depends on the collectively constructed interpretation frames, identity and mutual solidarity (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 20) . The movement parties are among many other social movement organizations in this setting, though they are the most prominent. This also includes, that the emergence of Jobbik and LMP doesn't involves the total disappearance of the social movement; nevertheless it implicates the loss of valuable resources for the movement.
In the case of Jobbik, for the general public the existence of a strong movement background seems to be indisputable, but there were also many activists of the Hungarian global justice movement among the politicians and supporters of the LMP. The institutionalization of the LMP was preceded by many years of civil work, thus the party could rely on those intellectual assets, activist networks and mobilization experiences, which were accumulated during such protest actions as the demonstrations against the Iraq war in 2003, the protests against a NATO radar installation on the Zengő peak or the cyclists' marches in Budapest known as Critical Mass. Political pundits and outsiders criticized the LMP for the lack of clear messages and a political program, however, the organizations, which were at the birth of the party already possessed coherent, elaborated social and political claims. Ecopolitics has its own history in Hungary, even from the time of the democratic transition.
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Despite the inner debates of the Hungarian global justice movement, ecopolitics could not be connected closely to any political bloc even before the formation of the LMP. The Jobbik was transformed from a social movement organization into a political party, which -like the Western European radical right parties -are major mobilizers of the radical right movement. In contrast to the LMP, the party was already formed by the time of mobilization push in 2006. Many different social movement organizations participated in that protest cycle, however none of them threatened the key role of Jobbik and the party status monopole in the movement. Both parties have an anti-establishment character. In the case of the LMP it derives from the stance of ecopolitics, according to which the global problems cannot be solved with the politics of the old left-right cleavage. While at Jobbik the harsh antiestablishment position comes from the new radical right character of the party.
According to the typology of Gunther and Diamond, both parties fall under the category of movement parties (2003) , which are at the fluid border of political parties and social movements. Conventionally, the left-libertarian (e.g. German Greens) and the post-industrial extreme right parties (e.g., Austrian Freedom Party) are classified as movement parties. The debut of the movement parties is closely related to the defects of representation, the incapacity of established political parties to channel the voice of citizens (Ignazi, 1996: 553) . The structural transformation of production, employment and education in developed Western societies liberated the individual from traditional social bonds and left a broad space for self-fulfillment. This change to post-industrial societies created new desires to un-conventional forms of participation and a new political agenda focusing on issues of post-materialism. On this social bases could emerge the so called new social movements in the late '60s and '70s, which stabilized the post-materialist political cleavage and carved out a space for the WesternEuropean left-libertarian, ecological or New Politics parties that first appeared in the '70s (Kitschelt, 1988) . The first direct European Parliament election in 1979 meant an electoral breakthrough for green parties in Belgium, Germany and France. However, the green parties could not reach the threshold in 1979, but the still inspiratory result paved the way for the German, French, and Dutch greens to enter the European Parliament in 1984 and later into their national assemblies as well (Rootes, 1994) . These parties were organized along the post-materialist cleavage and their constituency had basically middle and upper-middle class origin. After the institutionalization, these parties still had an intellectual character, which is the reason why they can be referred to as cadre parties (Paastela, 2008: 72) .
In Eastern Europe, environmentalist groups have been active during the democratic transition and green issues were on the agenda as well. Stressing environmental problems could be useful for different opposition groups as catch-all issues and also as a "training ground" for activists. This catch-all nature also meant that environmentalism did not appear in its pure nature, but interconnected with other issues, like human rights, peace, or nationalism. In the absence of a green "master frame", due to the professionalization of activists and as economic reconstruction and social issues proved to be of more concern to the population, environmentalism became marginalized (Rootes, 1197: 335, 342) . While the Czech greens could enter the national parliament in 1992 after an obscure electoral coalition, which resulted in the loss of two-thirds of their membership (Jehlicka and Kostelecky, 1994: 167) The post-industrial transformation created not only a broadened space for selfrealization and for the individual choice of identities, but produced a higher level of uncertainty and alienation through the devaluation of those traditional social relationships like family, kinship and within smaller communities. The insecurity produced by the atomization of society favored the desire for more order, tradition and security (Ignazi, 1996: 557) . This other outcome of the post-industrial change, i.e., a growing neoconservative mood in Western Europe with the general decline of the party as such, party de-alignment and an increasingly volatile electorate fostered the third wave of the radical right in Europe in the late '80s and the appearance of a new type of radical right parties. Therefore, these new party genres can also be understood as an answer to the post-materialist revolution, since these are similar to the leftlibertarian and ecologist parties in terms of strong engagement and identity politics. Contrary to the parties of the old radical right-wing, the new radical right-wing parties do not have fascist imprinting, but have a stronger right wing anti-system position (Ignazi, 1992 ). An ideal type of the new radical rightwing parties was/is the French Front National. The success of FN at the 1984 European election also meant a breakthrough of new radical right-wing parties. A new master frame developed by FN stressed anti-immigration, cultural differences and ethnopluralism, instead of purely racial issues. Thus the FN could successfully avoid the accusation of racism and stay in the gray zone between the extreme and the conservative right. Moreover, the populist, anti-political-establishment feature of the new master frame of FN allowed it to criticize contemporary democratic institutions without being stigmatized as antidemocratic. This new master frame was later adopted by the whole party family of new radical rightwing parties elsewhere in Europe (Rydgren, 2005) . While the immigration agenda could not be fully exploited in Eastern Europe, a new formula of radical right can be detected in Eastern Europe as well, most notably in the case of the Bulgarian Attack or the Hungarian Jobbik, which have lead to much attention by Western journalists and pundits especially in the latter case. However, compared to Western Europe, the differences are not as great as is often assumed, neither can either part of Europe be treated homogeneously in this matter (Mudde, 2005: 260) Although the new radical right-wing parties have not yet reached relevant government positions in Western and Eastern Europe, due to the tabloidization of public discourse, the economic crisis and their learning capacity, the new radical right-wing parties can still be significant in European politics (Mudde, 2013 That kind of radical right, which gives the social basis of Jobbik is a relatively new social phenomenon in Hungary, since it differs from the radical right before and after the Hungarian democratic transition in terms of organization, patterns of mobilization, and means of framing. In the following I give a brief review of the three different types of the Hungarian radical right, which also shows its chronological transformation. It is important to note though, that these forms also existed simultaneously.
Skinhead subculture
In Hungary the first skinhead groups, which followed the Western European examples first appeared in the late '80s (Bernáth, et al., 2005: 80) . These were based typically on urban youth subcultures such as gangs and so these groups had a strong inner cohesion and strongly differed from the majority of society in terms of dress and habits. Violent actions committed in small groups against foreign students and Roma people were typical (Szabó, 2009: 268-269) , though in the case of early skinhead groups a coherent political worldview cannot be discovered. Their political orientation was defined by their resistance against the official ideology of the communist Kádár regime, by western examples, and by conflicts with other urban youth subcultures. The skinhead subculture expanded immediately after the democratic transition in [1989] [1990] , and turned more political thanks to political entrepreneurs, who desired to gain political influence with the help of the subculture. As a consequence and also as a cause of the clearer political orientation the skinheads became more professionalized. Apart from the smaller gangs those groups gained significance, which managed their domestic and international relations (Blood and Honor).
The skinhead subculture gained its political character due to the restrictions of the Kádár system, but otherwise it was similar to other youth subcultures. The subcultural nature wore out during the politicization at the time of, and after the democratic transition. The skinhead movement exhausted due to the change of the legal environment, the stricter reaction by and because of the aging of the members of skinhead groups. Besides these factors the dissolution of the subcultural identity had a significant effect as well. As politicians tried to use the skinheads for their own political goals, and as the costs of belonging to the subculture sank the most important asset of the subculture, the credibility was endangered.
Folkish radicalism
After the democratic transition another important actor of the Hungarian radical right was the internal right-populist opposition of the government faction's parties. The genesis of the folkish-right radicalism was an essay of István Csurka published in the weekly newspaper Magyar Fórum (Bárány, 1994) . This essay was a peculiar re-
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interpretation of the democratic transition, which gave the basis of the right-populist movement's master frame of the Hungarian society and politics. The main organization of the folkish-right radicalism was the political party MIÉP, which consciously used explanations of the political-social situation resembling the folkish-urban dispute in the inter-war period in Hungary, allowing the use of the folkish-radical label. Not only the generational gap, the different interpretations of adversaries and of society, the level of political consciousness separates the skinheads subculture and the folkish-radicals, but the patterns of organization as well, since in this case the core of the organization was a political party: first the MDF and later the MIÉP after the secession of the folkish-radicals ( Table 1) .
The political explanations of the folkish-radicals meant an adequate reading for many people to understand the social problems after the democratic transition, the political solutions proved to be too abstract to be a tangible, acceptable political program. The dominance of the political party MIÉP and chairman István Csurka within the folkish-radical movement made it inflexible, made the debates on the control of resources harsher and finally the folkish-radicals became insignificant. From the aspect of the whole radical right, it was the folkish-radicals who elaborated the interpretation frame that is still valid today. This frame gives explanations of the democratic transition. Apart from the ideology, the folkish-radicals established the cultural -symbolic infrastructure of the movement, which proved to be necessary for the development of the new radicalism and of the Jobbik party.
New radicalism
The emergence of the third type of the Hungarian radical right is the result of a generational shift and the change of the organizational patterns, action forms and interpretation frames of the movement. By the new millennium the cultural background of the folkish-radicals around the MIÉP party had solidified. A set of publishers, journals bridged the gap between the governing right-wing conservatives and the radical right. The political folklore of the radical right fulfilled the same role, which offered involvement and orientation beyond the official politics, similar to the lifestyle politics of the new social movements. Besides the cultural infrastructure, the movement's network was broadened by the organizations, which liked to give space for political actions primarily for younger radical activists. These organizations first worked with the MIÉP party, but later also against it.
The movement changed not only in terms of organization logic after the new millennium, but in the nature of collective action as well. Compared to the earlier period spontaneous, not registered and violent protests took place more often. The first of such kind of event was the so called "Elizabeth-bridge battle", when the protesters blocked the transit at the Elisabeth-bridge in order to achieve the recount the votes of the 2002 parliamentary elections by the national election agency. Four years later the disclosure of the "Őszöd-speech" of the socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány triggered an extraordinarily violent protest wave (Szabó, 2007: 169-171 ). In his speech, which was held exclusively for the members of the socialist parliamentary faction, Gyurcsány admitted that they had lied about the financial situation of the country.
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The events in 2002 and of the "hot autumn" in 2006 changed not only the repertoire of collective action and the policing of protest in Hungary, but strengthened the radical right movement as well (Szabó, 2009: 282) . The participation on protest events and permanent occupation of public spaces increased the cohesion of groups and individuals reinforced the movement's collective identity and the internal solidarity by the clear identification of adversaries. As a consequence of police brutality during the "hot autumn" in 2006 interesting phenomena appeared, namely the radical right civil rights protection and citizen's ethos. This kind of civil rights protection relies on liberal principles of law, but it applies those in a particular way, only in the cases of the supporters, activist and allies of the radical right movement.
Máté Szabó describes the events of 2006 as a "postmodern riot", which illustrates the eclectic character of motivations, strategies, and goals of different groups and individuals participating in the protests during the "hot autumn" (Szabó, 2007: 186-187) . This kind of diversity can be traced not only during the protest events, but it is a main feature of the whole movement. It can be stated that the radical right became a real movement after the new millennium: a network of loose networks intertwined by the collective identity and internal solidarity elaborated during collective protest actions. The permanently constructed interpretative frames identify the objectives, targets, and adversaries. The polyphony, the aestheticization of politics, which pervades individual life-strategies, the political folklore as an essential part of the movement and the new communication technologies made recruitment easier. This also contributed to the opportunity for the radical right to break out from political quarantine. The radical right cannot be identified with only one group, but it is the tissue of different and sometimes only indirectly linked political, social and cultural phenomena. This is also the main reason why we do not use the term "extreme right" in this paper, since that label would hide the real nature of the movement. The lack of political ecology in mainstream politics does not mean that environmentalism would be fully absent from Hungarian political life. The ecological movement was an important breeding ground for civil initiatives since the mid '80s as more space in the public sphere was liberated (Szabó, 1998: 124-125; Pickvance, 1998: 75-76) . The individual strategies proved to be inefficient in order to overcome the deepening socio-economic crisis, therefore re-emerged the collective forms of searching for alternatives. Besides the 'transmission belt' organizations (Ekiert and Kubik, 2014: 47) , i.e., the pseudo-movements embedded into the monolith power structures, already before the democratic transition new, authentic forms of selforganization arose. The issues of these movements (environmentalism, international peace) were similar as those of the western new social movements. With the help of these "soft" issues it became possible to express the general dissatisfaction with the Kádár-system, without challenging its principles. One of the main mass movements at the dawn of the democratic transition was the Duna-circle. Their main issue was to hinder the building of the Bős-Nagymaros hydroelectric power plant, which could have harmed the ecosystem of the Danube Bend. However, after the transition environmentalism did not become a major political question. The last technocrat government before the democratic elections changed the official standpoint in the question of the hydroelectric power plant, and so the conflict became a legal dispute between the Hungary and Czechoslovakia, hence the integrative power of the issue declined. With the onset of the formal negotiations between the opposition and the representatives of the communist party, the questions of the new constitutional system proved to be more important than any of environmental issues.
The alternative movement in Hungary -just like in West-European countriescriticized the patterns of bureaucratic modernization, the colonization of the "lifeworld" by the "system". A major difference was though, that while the western environmentalists defined themselves vis-à-vis the "old" politics that was based on representative democracy, in Hungary all of those groups that claimed the autonomy of social subsystems or searched for alternative paths of modernization created one platform. That is why such a huge industrial investment like the Bős-Nagymaros hydroelectric power plant became a cardinal political conflict at the time of the system change in Hungary. However, the case of the hydroelectric power plant could not turn into an integrative issue for the alternative movement as nuclear energy in West Germany did. Because of the lack of ecological conflicts and due to the general consensus on environmentalism green issues did not play a significant role in the first elections (Waller and Millard, 1992) . To put it simply, environmentalism did not evolve into green politics.
Environmentalists of the ‛90s
After the democratic transition the environmental groups lost political significance, since in the democratic framework the political parties became the main channels to express claims, interests and political values. With the emergence of political parties
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the green groups also lost some of their leaders and supporters (Pickvance and Gabor, 2001: 110) . Moreover, due to the new environmental standards claimed by the European Union and with the help of development funds, the technocrat aspect of handling environmentalist issues became dominant. Without countrywide ecological conflicts and comprehensive protest campaigns the environmentalist sector institutionalized rapidly. As a consequence professional advocacy groups and think tanks and not political parties or loosely organized social movement organizations turned out to be the major actors. The environmental groups of the '90s are the bearers of the so-called transactional activism (Petrova and Tarrow, 2007 The real change for the green, or in a broader sense for the radical left-libertarian movement, came with the new millennium. The protests in Seattle, Genoa, and Prague against the international economic regimes and neoliberal globalization made the global justice movement visible to the global public. These events had their effect in Hungary as well: a new type of environmentalist movement and activism emerged (Harper, 2006: 13-14; Kerényi and Szabó, 2006) . According to this movement the environmental problems are rooted in the system of global redistribution and economic control. However, the global justice movement in Hungary could not involve as many supporters as similar groups did in Western-European or South American countries.
Important social movement organizations were the Védegylet (Protect the Future), which functioned as a green think-tank, the Zöld Fiatalok (Green Youth) followed the patterns of lifestyle politics of the international movement and the Hungarian branch of the international organization ATTAC. Next to the new organizations the Humanist Movement and the Humanist Party also had an important role in the Hungarian movement. The Hungarian global justice movement was divided on the question of the applicability of the left-right political categories. This dispute had an effect on the self-determination of the movement's identity and on the possible alliances. ATTAC promoted the utilization of the "left" category, while the green activists like the Védegylet and the Zöld Fiatalok liked to avoid such categories.
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According to them a new type of politics could be discredited with the old political labels. The examples of the global movement were not the only factors which helped the Hungarian global justice movement to mobilize and form a collective identity: there was a major environmental conflict, the Zengő case, as well (Scheiring, 2006) . According to NATO agreements Hungary was to build a radar station at her southern border. The left-liberal government chose the Zengő peak as the place to build the station. Activists chained themselves to the trees that were to be cut down, lay on the ground in front of the bulldozers and held a nonstop watch to prevent trees being cut down at night. The struggle of the activist bore fruit and the radar station was not built on the Zengő peak. Moreover, this success reaffirmed the movement's collective identity, strengthened the network, bonds between activists and as a consequence it led to institutionalization of the green alternative movement. In 2009 those organizations and activists, who participated in the Zengő conflict founded the ecologist party, the LMP. It is important to note, that the leftist wing of the movement did not engaged in the Zengő conflict, which facilitated the institutionalization of the green wing and defined the profile of the LMP at the same time. Table 1 shows the three distinct types of the radical right movement according to organizational structure, issues and forms of collective actions. Table 2 shows the similar dimensions in the case of the green-alternative movement. Three distinct types could be distinguished in both cases. The fulfillment of the movements ended before the movement parties would enter the Hungarian parliament.
Political opportunity structure, political context
According to the political process model of the resource mobilization theory, the success of mobilization is the matter of the organizational "readiness" of the community, the level of insurgent consciousness in the movement's mass base, and the structure of political opportunities (McAdam, 1982: 40) . The concept of political opportunity structure was elaborated by Peter Eisinger (1973) : political protest tend to occur in semi-open or semi-closed systems, since in a fully open system there is no need to protest and in fully closed ones the individual costs would be to high due to oppression by law enforcement.
The formal political institutional framework, the informal political processes and prevailing strategies, and the distribution of power are all part of the political opportunity structure (Kriesi et al., 1997: 52) . In another categorization political opportunities are a matter of widening access to political participation, the loosening of political blocs and conflicts among the elite groups (Tarrow, 2011: 164-165) . It also possible to move beyond the political processes and explicitly political institutions. The probability of political protest is increased by "expanding cultural opportunities (McAdam, 1996: 25) . These are the contradictions between social values with high normative power and the general social practices, the "suddenly imposed grievances", the dramatization of the vulnerability and illegitimacy of a given
MIKECZ, D.: CHANGING MOVEMENTS, EVOLVING PARTIES: THE PARTY-ORIENTED STRUCTURE OF THE HUNGARIAN RADICAL RIGHT AND ALTERNATIVE MOVEMENT 111
political system and a comprehensive master frame, with which challengers can map their grievances and claims. Instead of political opportunity structure, Dieter Rucht uses the concept of context to define that environment, which offers opportunities for the movements. In his theoretical framework the cultural and the social contexts also have an important role besides the political one. Similar to other authors, who describe the political opportunity structure, the political opportunity context is defined by the following factors: the openness of the political system and access to the policy making process, the policy effectiveness of the authorities, the alliance networks of a movement and the conflict system, which involves the movement's adversaries (Rucht, 1996: 188-191) . The context system also defines the dominant organizational pattern in the case of a given movement genre and in the whole social environment as well. According to Rucht, the possible schemes are the grassroots, the advocacy, and the party oriented model. A dominant model does not exclude different organizational patterns in the same society, since one social movement can involve grassroots organizations, advocacy groups, and political parties as well. To give an example from our Hungarian cases: in the '90s the advocacy model dominated the green-alternative movement, while the radical right movement was characterized by the party-oriented model at the time of folkish radicalism (Table 3) . In the grassroots model, the structure of the movement is decentralized and loose and there is more emphasis on radical protest politics and informal networks. The interest-group model is characterized by advocacy activity and formal organizations. Formal organizations have a pivotal role in the party-oriented model as well, and the focus is on electoral process and party politics (Rucht, 1996: 188) . As Rucht put it, the political opportunities form the movement structure, i.e., the dominant model of organization, which influences the strategies of the movement. According to Rucht's hypothesis, there are more resources available to an organization if decision-making is open, the authorities' effectiveness in implementing policies is lower, the alliance networks are stronger, the adversaries are weaker and the value structure of the society is more consonant. On the other hand, in this scenario the movements' structures are more formalized, i.e., they follow the patterns of the advocacy and the party-oriented model -which is crucial from the aspect of party formation (Rucht, 1996: 191-192 concluded, that the French movements are following the party-oriented, the Americans the advocacy models, while in West Germany all three models can be found. In France lobbying is not a very effective tool, therefore for challengers it is worth it to found a new party, which can meet strong institutional obstacles, but the disillusionment in traditional parties gives a chance for a breakthrough. In the political system of the United States it is not feasible for new parties to enter the legislature even at the state level. However, lobby and advocacy activities have an old tradition in the American political culture, thus the advocacy model is dominant in the case of the feminist and the ecologist movement as well (Rucht, 1996: 199-201) . In West Germany the movement sector is strong, the federal polity, the public administration, and constitutional courts at the state level enable more room for advocacy. On the other hand, the federal system encourages the foundation of new parties, since there are more arenas for political competition, while political parties are traditionally dominant in German politics. As Rucht compares the characteristics of the context structures of the three analyzed countries, he stresses the importance of access to decision-making and the party structure, the policy implementation capacity and the presence or absence of allies and opponents. In the following section, the paper analyzes the political context along these variables.
If we want to understand the circumstances of the institutionalization of the radical right and the green-alternative movement, i.e., the party formation of Jobbik and LMP, we have to consider, that the political opportunity context is in a permanent state of change, and the movements themselves also have an impact on their environment. The external factors, which are influencing the radical right and the green-alternative movements, are different. This is an obvious fact in the case of alliance networks and the adversaries of the movement, but state policies can also have different impacts on the movements, since their core issues and claims vary as well.
Party system and openness of decision-making
In general terms, the Hungarian party system did not favor newcomer parties (Enyed, 2006) or independent candidates. The Hungarian election system, which was in effect at the time of the 2010 general elections, could not be labeled as a simply majoritarian or proportional one, but as a mixed-member majoritarian system. In the two-ballot system citizens voted for territorial party lists (20) and for single candidates as well. In order to establish a territorial list, parties needed to have candidates at least in onequarter of the single member districts of that larger territorial district, moreover, lost votes in single member districts were allocated to the compensation list (Benoit, 1996: 68-169; 2003: 10) . These were important incentives for political parties to establish candidates in single member districts. The whole system favored political parties at the expense of independent candidates, and proved to be closed, since no new parties could enter parliament until the 2010 elections. As the election system is generally closed and the nomination procedure urges new challengers to establish an effective organizational structure, a broad network of activists, as the five percent threshold does in Germany (Rucht, 1996: 201) . At this point however it is important to note, that by the 2010 general elections there was a considerable frustration with the MIKECZ, D.: CHANGING MOVEMENTS, EVOLVING PARTIES: THE PARTY-ORIENTED STRUCTURE OF THE HUNGARIAN RADICAL RIGHT AND ALTERNATIVE MOVEMENT 113 traditional and especially with the reigning parties in the electorate. This opened new opportunities, more access to the party system for challengers i.e., the LMP and the Jobbik. The liberal coalition partner of the socialists, the SZDSZ was already at the verge of dissolution at the time of the elections, which meant more support for the green-alternative LMP. In general terms, movement entrepreneurs enter the arena of party politics, if the barriers are low, if electoral success seems to be a realistic prospect (Kitschelt, 2006: 282) . Various acts and government decrees regulated the participation of civil organizations in the decision-making process. Despite the many options of participating in the decision-making processes, a study relying on expert interviews emphasizes the shortcomings of the system. The procedural part of these acts is not regulated properly, which hinders effective participation. Moreover, the civil organizations do not have the opportunity to take part in formulating alternatives, but they only have the option to make comments about already prepared proposals. Sometimes the whole process is reduced to mere information giving (Bela et al, 2003) . While the closed election system is an objective factor for both social movements, the green-alternative movement has more access to decision-making process, if only with some barriers. On the other hand, the radical right movement does not aim to put policy recommendations on the agenda, but to change the criminal law and the whole constitutional system. Obviously, this latter could not be the subject of political consultation with the reigning left-liberal coalitions between 2002 and 2010.
Policy implementation capacity
The effectiveness refers to those issues, which are in the center of the movement's agenda and claims. If the state is unable or unwilling to handle these problems, that can push the movements to elaborate more formalized structures. Ultimately, such issues can form the main agenda of a new political party. Policy failure has a different nature of the two movements. In the case of the Hungarian radical right movement, the ban of the Hungarian Guard can be identified as examples for the "extremist" protection of citizens' rights (Hajnal, 2010: 15) . This means, that the policy implementation failure is not a single case, but a systematic phenomenon, which is the consequence of the counterproductive protection of those who are breaking the norms of the current policy. While the Hungarian Guard, the paramilitary organization of Jobbik was banned by the Hungarian authorities, due to the protection of right to assembly, this ban could not really go into effect, which proved the weakness of the state vis-á-vis the radical right movement. From the aspect of the context system, the situation of the Roma minority has a more important role though. In this case it is not about the "extremist" protection of citizens' rights, but the latent and manifest anti-Roma sentiments in Hungary (Halász, 2009: 492) was exploited by radical right as it was translated to criminal and welfare issues and policy recommendations and so demonstrated the policy ineffectiveness of the state. Regarding the alternative movement, specific fields of policy failure cannot be identified. However, the policy systems of Central and Eastern European countries are dealing with such structural problems, which are different from the general deficiencies of bureaucratic systems and are unique in the case of post-communist regimes (Hajnal, 2006: 152-153) . The defects of policy implementation capacity of the state are obvious in the light of international practices of environmental policies.
Allies and adversaries
At the time of the two terms of the left-liberal coalition between 2002 and 2010 both movements gained some support from the opposition. In the case of the radical right, politicians of the Fidesz party participated at the events of the "Hot Autumn" in 2006 and at the foundation of the Hungarian Guard paramilitary wing of Jobbik. The green-alternative movement got some support from the Fidesz press at time of the Zengő conflict. The green-alternative movement had support from external actors as well, as prominent representatives of the global justice movement (Noam Chomsky, José Bové) attended the events of the green-alternative movement. The principal adversary of the radical right movement was the left-liberal government, while the green-alternatives rejected the whole political establishment, though by its very nature a social movement, they had more conflicts with the government than with the opposition.
Conclusions
Both the radical right and the green-alternative movement went through a transformation process related to their success after the new millennium. The radical right is not limited to the Jobbik alone. Though the Jobbik is the most visible part of the movement, with a decisive effect on the dynamic of the radical right, there are many other organizations, informal groups, and political and cultural initiatives that constitute the movement. After the advocacy activity in the 1990s, the green-alternative movement was inspired by the global justice movement in terms of issues, symbols, and protest repertoire. As a consequence, a new type of activism appeared which could give comprehensive political interpretations and attracted new supporters. However, identity politics was an important innovation not only in the case of the green-alternative movement, but also in leisure activities and historical reenactments.
radical right movement green-alternative movement access to party system medium medium access to decision making closed medium policy implementation capacity low medium allies medium weak opponents strong medium Table 4 : The political opportunity context in respect of the two movements
The dominance of the party-oriented model can be understood through the analysis of the opportunity context (Table 4) . According to this, the frustration with the reigning socialist and liberal parties opened the closed party system to new challengers. Since the election system still favored political parties instead of independent candidates, newcomers should concentrate their resources and move to MIKECZ, D.: CHANGING MOVEMENTS, EVOLVING PARTIES: THE PARTY-ORIENTED STRUCTURE OF THE HUNGARIAN RADICAL RIGHT AND ALTERNATIVE MOVEMENT 115
form parties with countrywide networks. The system of political consultation gave some access to the decision making process for the environmentalist civil organizations, though this only allowed for expression of consent or disapproval, but provided no opportunity to formulate alternative proposals. This raised the role of advocacy model in the green-alternative movement, but it also led to the realization that real involvement in the decision-making can only be achieved with a political party as an institutional framework. This latter element is the most important incentive for the green-alternatives in the party formation. For the radical right movement this kind of political consultation does not grant real opportunities, thus the civil organizations of the radical right aim not to practice advocacy activities, but to achieve a certain cultural hegemony. The policy ineffectiveness in Central and Eastern Europe is a given condition for both movements, but in the case of the radical right, these policy failures and the incompetency of the state were more obvious. There have been some instances of overlap between the moderate and the radical right. There was no official cooperation, though the radical right movement did not receive much criticism from the side of the right wing parties. On the other hand, the stricter reactions of the left-wing government pushed the radical right to the party oriented model. From time to time the green-alternatives confronted government agencies and municipalities, but there was no such administrative repression as in the case of the radical right. The green-alternatives also lacked strong domestic allies, but they received more support from European green parties and the international global justice movement. In the case of the green-alternative movement the new electoral opportunities, the shortcomings of political consultation, and the lack of strong allies favored the party-oriented structure. For the radical right movement the expanded access to the party system, the ineffective policy implementation capacity of the state and the repression by the authorities pushed the movement's structure to the party-oriented model. Moreover, behind the success of the movement parties lies also the transformation of the movements, the fulfillment of movement networks and interpretative frames. 
